Abstract-In this paper, we address the security issue of optimal power flow (OPF) (as a key component in the smart grid). To be specific, we investigate the data integrity attack against OPF with the least effort from the adversary's perspective, and propose effectively defense schemes to combat the data integrity attack, with respect to the number of nodes to compromise and the amount of information to manipulate. The investigated attack can first select the minimum number of target nodes to compromise by analyzing the difference between the capacity of transmission line and the real transmission power, and then search for a critical attack vector as an optimal attack strategy. To defend against such an attack, we develop the defensive schemes by not only protecting the critical nodes but also detecting the existence of attacks based on false measurement detection schemes. Based on various IEEE standard systems, we show the effectiveness of our investigated attack scheme and the corresponding defense schemes. The experimental results show that the discovered compromised nodes and critical attack vector could lead to the increase of the fuel cost from the power generation by compromising the least number of nodes and injecting the least amount of false information, in comparison with the random attack as the baseline attack strategy. In addition, our two developed defensive schemes are capable of making OPF resilient to the data integrity attack via protecting critical nodes and identifying the falsified measurements accurately in the system. Index Terms-Cyber-physical systems, data integrity attacks, defensive strategy, Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications, least effort attack, optimal power flow (OPF).
I. INTRODUCTION
I N THIS paper, we address the security issue of optimal power flow (OPF) in the smart grid system, which is an important application supported by Internet-of-Things (IoT). IoT has attracted growing attention in the past and can be used to support various applications, including smart grid, smart transportation system, smart cities, etc.
[1]- [9] . Smart devices were demonstrated to be vulnerable, as evidenced by the recent IoT attacks of October 21, 2016 , causing many popular sites to become unreachable [10] . It also found that, behind this attack, particular compromised mass-produced smart devices (webcams and other similar products) were involved. OPF, as one of critical functional modules in the energy management system (EMS) [11] , has been widely used to identify an optimal operation in the smart grid system. OPF aims to minimize the objectives (e.g., fuel cost and/or power loss) by satisfying the constraints in the power grid system. Due to the integration of sensing, computing, and networking techniques [12] , [13] , the smart grid, also denoted as the future power grid system, becomes vulnerable to different cyber threats. One particular example is the data integrity attack (also denoted as the false data injection attack) [14] - [18] . In such attacks, the goal of the adversary is to mislead the power operation by compromising meters and injecting false information. Fig. 1 illustrates the paths of the adversary to invade the power grid system and to launch the data integrity attack against OPF. As seen in the figure, one avenue for the adversary to launching an attack against the system is through capturing the measurement equipment (smart sensors, remote terminal units, etc.) directly, and inject the attack vector into the measurements. The other pathway for the adversary is in invading the data transmission process in the network and injecting false information into the measurements. In either avenue, the adversary is capable of tampering with the measurements if he or she acquires the knowledge of the system (e.g., topology). Suffering from such attack, OPF could make wrong decisions and the operation of the power grid system could consequently be disrupted. Thus, impacts of data integrity attack against OPF should be systematically investigated and effective defensive schemes should be developed as well.
A number of research efforts have been developed to investigate impacts of data integrity attacks on power grid systems, and most of existing efforts demonstrated that data integrity attacks could bypass the bad data detection identification (BDDI) module [15] , [18] - [20] , and affect key functional modules of the grid operations, including state estimation, energy price, and the integration of renewable energy resources [13] , [15] - [18] , [21] - [27] . In addition, some efforts were developed to investigate data integrity attack on OPF. For example, Rahman et al. [28] , [29] investigated the feasibility of data integrity attacks on OPF by using the satisfiability modulo theories solver, but in these studies only a random blind attack strategy was introduced. While there are few efforts focused on investigating impacts of data integrity attacks against OPF, this security issue related to OPF remains to be a challenging issue due to the high uncertainty, computational complexity, and strong nonconvergence in OPF. Thus, the potential risk of data integrity attack against OPF needs to be seriously studied. To investigate the potential risk, the optimal attack vector with the least attack cost with respect to both the number of compromised nodes and the magnitude of manipulated information should be derived from the adversary's aspect first. Then, effective schemes used to defend against such an attack can be developed.
To derive the optimal attack strategy against OPF and design effective mitigation schemes to combat the data integrity attack, the following critical issues must be considered. First, due to the strong randomness of target nodes in OPF, it is challenging for the adversary to determine the nodes to compromise and simultaneously bypass the detection by the system operator. Second, due to the high computational complexity in OPF, it is challenging for the adversary to derive a feasible attack vector, which could maximize the impact of the attack on OPF with a minimum cost. Third, in defending against the data integrity attack, it is unrealistic to protect all the nodes in the system due to the high deployment cost. It is critical to develop the cost-effective protection-based scheme, which can select a small set of nodes to protect and make OPF resilient to the attack. In addition, it is critical to design effective anomaly detection with good features, which are capable of detecting the compromised measurements accurately and quickly.
In this paper, we address these issues outlined above. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
First, to determine the least number of target nodes to launch the attack against, we investigate the equality constraints and the physical property of transmission line in the OPF process. Our findings show that when the power flow of the transmission line surpasses its upper restriction, the minimal fuel cost as the objective of OPF [refer to F(P G i ) in (1) in Section II-A] will be increased. Based on this insightful observation, we find that to launch the attack with the minimum cost, the line (on which the difference between the actual and limited power flow is the smallest) will be determined as the targeted line to be attacked. Consequently, the nodes that are connected with the corresponding target line will be selected as the nodes to be attacked.
Second, for the design of the optimal attack strategy for compromising the least number of nodes and injecting the minimum false information, the adversary could inject the attack vector into the load active power in order to make the power flows of transmission line exceed their upper limitation. We formalize the problem of finding the critical attack vector to increase the minimum fuel cost as an objective of OPF by introducing the attack vector, as an unknown parameter, and the real transmission power into the original equality constraints of OPF. Then, the critical attack vector can be obtained by solving the modified equality constraint equations. By recognizing the critical attack vector, the attack will be successful if and only if the attack vector is larger than the critical value identified.
Third, to defend against the data integrity attack, we propose two types of defense schemes: 1) protection-based defense and 2) detection-based defense. For the protection-based defense, we consider the nodes which are directly connected to the lines that are closest to the upper limitation of transmitted power flows on the lines as the critical nodes. These critical nodes should be protected by smart sensors [phasor measurement unit (PMU), etc.] that have more security protection than normal sensors [23] , [30] . For the detection-based defense, we define the difference of phase angles on transmission lines as the detection feature, because the difference of phase angles is restricted. Based on the defined feature, when the observed difference of phase angles is larger than a deterministic upper bound, which is determined by the physical characteristic of transmission line, the data integrity attack is flagged. In addition, to detect attacks that manipulate measurements over time, we propose a temporal-based detection algorithm, which is based on the nonparametric cumulative sum (cusum) scheme.
Fourth, to validate the effectiveness of the investigated attacking and defensive schemes, we have conducted extensive experiments on various IEEE standard bus systems. The experimental results demonstrate that if and only if the attack vector crosses the critical value that is computed by the proposed algorithm, the attack is feasible, leading to the increase of the minimum fuel cost. Particularly, in an IEEE 30-bus system, the minimum fuel cost is raised by $ 86.5 /hr while only the load active power of two nodes need to be compromised.
The experimental results also demonstrate the effectiveness of the protection-based and detection-based defensive schemes. Protecting the critical nodes can be helpful in preventing the system from the data integrity attack by reducing the attack impact and increasing attack cost. Particularly, in an IEEE 14-bus system, the minimum fuel cost of OPF remains unchanged after protecting critical nodes, even when different attack vectors with various intensities are implemented. In addition, the detection based on the nonparametric cusum scheme is able to recognize the existence of attacks rapidly and accurately.
Part of this paper was published in [31] . Based on the much short conference version, we have made substantial extensions and revisions in this submission. The extensions include the detailed system model and threat model, substantially extended attack and defense algorithms and analysis, additional performance evaluation, and thorough literature reviews, etc. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the basic model of OPF. In Section III-B, we introduce the optimal attack strategy against OPF, including the basic idea, the selection of target nodes to be attacked, and the computation of the critical attack vector. In Section IV, we propose the defense schemes to make OPF secure. In Section V, we present experimental results based on different IEEE standard bus systems. We conduct a literature review in Section VI. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first review the model of OPF, and then present threat model used in this paper. Table I shows key notations used in this paper.
A. OPF Model
To describe the process of OPF, we first introduce its objective function, and then introduce the equality constraints and inequality constraints associated with OPF.
1) Objective Function:
In this paper, we focus on the minimal fuel cost as the objective of OPF [32] . This refers to minimizing the fuel cost under the conditions of the power grid system, satisfying transmission, generation, and system level operation constraints. The objective function can be expressed by
Here, a i , b i , and c i are the factors associated with the fuel cost of power generator i, which are determined by the physical properties of generator i. In addition, P i g represents the output of generated active power at node i, g(x) is the power flow equality constraint, and h(x) represents the security constraints of the power grid system (the constraint of node voltage, the constraint of active and reactive power at generator nodes, etc.). The constraints in OPF can be categorized into equality and inequality constraints, which will be described below.
2) Equality Constraints: In a dc power grid system [33] , the voltage in the system is considered as unit value. Thus, the real active power flowing in the transmission line between node i and node j can be formalized to be
where θ i and θ j represent the phase angle at node i and node j, respectively, d ij is the admittance on the line between node i and node j, and N is the number of nodes in the power grid system. In addition, the law of power balance should be satisfied and can be expressed as
where P i d and P i g refer to the load active power at node i and the generation active power at node i, k is the number of generators in the power grid system, m the number of nodes with nonzero load active power, and P C is the total power loss in all transmission lines. Without the loss of generality, we assume that the power loss in each line is zero, meaning that the sum of the load active power of all nodes is equal to the sum of the active power output of all generators.
According to the power balance among nodes, the OPF should satisfy the following equality constraints:
P L l are the sum of power flowing out and flowing into node j that is connected to line l. P C j is the consumption of the active power at node j, and P j g is the output of generation active power at node j.
According to (2), after substituting P L l with respect to (4), we have the following constraint:
3) Inequality Constraints: To ensure the safe and stable operation in the power grid system, the following inequality constraints need to be satisfied: (6) where P i g min and P i g max are the lower and upper bound of the active power of each generator. Also, U i represents the voltage amplitude at node i, U min i and U max i are the lower and upper limit of the voltage magnitude at node i, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume the voltage of all nodes is united in value and negligible in the dc power grid system. In the third inequality shown above, θ i and θ j present the phase angle at node i and node j, respectively, θ ij is the difference of phase angles between node i and node j, θ ij max represents the maximal difference of phase angles, P l represents the active power on the transmission line l, and P L l max is the maximal active power on the transmission line l.
B. Threat Model
We now declare some assumptions made in this paper. In the dc power grid system, the line losses are not considered. We assume that the adversary only holds partial information of the power grid system (e.g., topology) before implementing and launching the attack. We also assume that the adversary is capable of capturing and tampering with the measurement equipment, which are directly connected to the power grid system (smart meters, sensors, etc.). In this paper, we assume that the power plant is secure and the adversary cannot directly attack it, meaning that the generator nodes are unavailable to be attacked by the adversary. That is to say, the measurements related to power generation (i.e., the output of generators) are considered to be secured and cannot be compromised by the adversary. It is worth noting that, in this paper we consider a realistic scenario, in which the adversary intends to launch an attack with the least effort (e.g., the least number of nodes to capture and the least amount of false data injected) due to limited attack resources and available information, while simultaneously satisfying the constraints of (6) to make the attack hard to be detected.
III. ATTACK STRATEGY
In this section, we first present the basic idea of the attack strategy, and then formalize the optimal data integrity attack model and corresponding mechanisms. After that, to realize the optimal data integrity attack, we develop mechanisms to identify the least number of target nodes to be compromised and construct the critical attack vector to inject the least amount of false information.
A. Basic Idea
Recall that in OPF, the optimal distribution of the power output from the generator can be realized to minimize the fuel cost in the system. Then, if the output power of the generator deviates from its optimal value while the power flow on the transmission line remains within its capacity limit, the optimal fuel cost (the minimum cost) cannot be achieved. Thus, by constructing a rational attack vector, the adversary is able to increase the minimum fuel cost by affecting the power output from the generator. From the OPF model shown in (1), the minimum fuel cost (F(P g i )) is closely related to the output of generator i (P g i ) and the load active power (P d i ). Recall that we assume that the outputted power from generator cannot be attacked by the adversary. Then, the only measurement available for the adversary is the load active power P d i . Again, in this paper we consider a realistic scenario, in which the adversary intends to launch an attack with the least effort, which is composed of: 1) the least number of nodes to capture and compromise and 2) the least amount of false data injected, due to limited resources and available information while satisfying constraints in (6) to avoid being detected.
In OPF, if the adversary tampers with the load active power of several arbitrary nodes carefully, the sum of the load active power can remain unchanged. As the total output of generators will not be changed, the detection based on the power balance [34] can be avoided. In addition, because the restriction of each transmission line depends on its physical properties, it is difficult for the adversary to inject the false data into the load active power, and increase the power flow on some transmission lines above the constraints, which directly result in OPF being unable to achieve optimal distribution. Thus, the property of line capacity provides a flexibility for the adversary to launch the attack.
To launch a successful data integrity attack, it is critical to address the issues of increasing the minimal fuel cost and bypassing detection [34] . To address these two issues, the adversary needs to select a set of nodes to compromise without being detected, and derive an effective attack vector that can increase the line's power flow, surpassing its upper bound, instead of randomly attacking as investigated in [28] and [29] .
We now illustrate the basic idea of our investigated attack scheme in detail by addressing these two issues.
1) To launch the least effort attack that compromises the minimum number of nodes, we consider that the adversary needs to falsify at least two returned measurements of load active power strategically and collusively. To avoid the detection based on power balance, the adversary needs to increase the load active power of one and reduce the other. 2) To achieve the goal of the least false data injection, we notice that the transmission line is constrained by its physical capacity such that the line, in which the difference between actual and limited power flow is smallest, can be determined to be the target line. Consequently, the nodes connected to the corresponding line are the target nodes. After that, the vector injected into target nodes that increase the line transmission power to its upper capacity is considered as the critical attack vector. Once the attack vector is larger than the critical value, the attack becomes effective.
B. Attack Strategy
In the following, we introduce the attack strategy in detail. To be specific, we first outline the problem formalization, and then describe both how to select a set of nodes to compromise with a goal of expending the least effort, and how to construct the optimal attack vector with a goal of injecting the least false information into the system.
1) Problem Formalization:
We now formalize the data integrity attack against OPF. Recall that, based on the basic principle of OPF, we know that the minimum fuel cost of the power grid system corresponds to a set of optimal generator output P g . Once the adversary is able to deviate P g from the optimal value, the minimum fuel cost is increased as a consequence.
Before introducing the attack model, we first define the following parameters P L i , P j d , P j g , and P C j , which represent the transmission power flow on line i and the load power, generator output power, and power consumption at node j, respectively. In the power grid system, according to the power equation determined by physical law, we have
where P ij and d ij are the power flow and admittance on the transmission line between node i and j. Then, we can derive the power loss at node j by
where L j,in and L j,out are the branches connected to node j.
Here, L j,in and L j,out are the branches, on which power is flowed into node j and out from node j.
Recall that we assume the active power output of a generator cannot be injected in this paper, so that the adversary cannot tamper with the value of P j g directly. To increase the minimum fuel cost F(P g ), the adversary can only inject false values into P j d to affect P j g indirectly. Thus, the problem of the data integrity attacks against OPF can be formalized to be
Here, x = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n ) T . P j g and P j d are the generator active power output and load active power after attacks. H 1 is the coefficient matrix of the power balance equation, which is determined by the topology of the power grid system [35] .
In addition, because the structure of the power grid is a closed loop and the power balance constraint is always satisfied ( P j g = P j d ), the rank of the coefficient matrix will satisfy
where
g is the consumption of load active power. In other words, the above equations show that the constraint g(x) = 0 exists for nonzero solutions.
In summary, to launch a successful attack against OPF, the adversary should falsify the load active power P j d at first, while keeping the overall active power demand of the power grid system unchanged. Then, a new P j g different from the original optimal distribution will be obtained by computing the security constraints in the problem formalized in (9) , which is a nonlinear inequality for which nonzero solutions exist. Finally, the new P j g will be used by (9) to compute the minimum fuel cost. 
Algorithm 1 Selecting Target Nodes to Compromise
In doing this, the OPF is able to converge and the attack could bypass the security detection mechanism (BDDI) in EMS.
2) Selecting Target Nodes to Compromise: To launch the attack with the least false information injected, the adversary will prefer to compromise the nodes connected to the line, in which the actual active power flow is closest to its upper limit. To this end, the adversary should first obtain the actual transmission active power P L l in line l, and find the maximal transmission active power P L l max among them. For a power grid system with l transmission lines, the difference between the actual transmission active power and its maximal value can be expressed as follows:
To this end, the line with the smallest value of P i is selected as the targeted line. We denote those transmission lines as i 1 , . . . , i l , and we have
where i 1 · · · i l are the indices of P in ascending sequence. To launch the attack, the adversary should inject an incremental data P at node e i to keep the total power of all the generators equal to the total amount of load demand in the power grid system. Then, we have (14) where k represents the number of generators and m indicates the number of load nodes.
Inspired by the above analysis, we now propose a scheme to select the target nodes. In our proposed scheme, we first find the maximum value of active power flows in all transmission lines. We then compute the difference between the actual active power and the maximum value for each transmission line. Finally, we sort the different values and select the minimum as the targeted line. The detailed procedure is given in Algorithm 1.
3) Finding Critical Attack Vector: After the target nodes are identified, the next issue for the adversary is to compute the attack vector with the least amount of information injected, namely the critical attack vector. We now present the scheme to construct the critical attack vector in detail.
Recall that once the transmission line active power surpasses its upper bound, the output of active power from the generator will be changed, as well as the minimum fuel cost. Moreover, it is worth noting that the output of active power from generator and the transmission line cannot be attacked directly. The goal of the adversary is to construct a rational attack vector injecting into the target load active power to increase the power flow on the transmission line. Meanwhile, to bypass the detection based on power balance equation by physical law, the adversary needs to ensure that the total active power output of the generator is constant and is equal to the sum of all load active power. To this end, the adversary can introduce a collusive strategy to manipulate at least two nodes simultaneously. For instance, the adversary can increase the measurements of one node and reduce the measurement of the other node, while the decreased value should be strictly inversely proportional to the increased value in order to satisfy the aforementioned constraint.
According to Section III-B2, assume that i 1 , . . . , i l are the target lines, e i and e j are the power outflow and injection nodes, respectively. The load active power at node e j is P e j d . Then, we have
Here, P e j d is the load active power after the attack is launched at node e j , where P e j d is the attack vector. To avoid the detection mechanism based on the power balance equation by physical law in the system, the adversary should inject false data into the load active power on node i simultaneously, and the attack vector is − P e j d , and we have
As a consequence, the original equality constraint in (9) can be updated by
where d e i e j is the admittance of the line between node e i and e j . By solving the problem formalized in (17), the attack vector P e j d can be obtained. We denote the attack vector that makes the actual active power transmitted on the target line i1 achieves its allowable capacity, satisfying P L i1 = P L i1max in (17), as the critical attack vector for node i.
To summarize, the adversary should update the equality constraint specified in (17) , solve the equation with the updated constraints, and store the updated results. After that, the above
Algorithm 2 Finding Critical Attack Vector
Ensure: Critical attack vector P 1: Initialization:
Solving P e j d (k(n)) according to Equation (17) 4: end for 5:
v = i 10: else 11:
end if 13: end for 14: return Target line K(v) and the attack vector P steps will be repeated to find the smallest of the stored values to be the critical attack vector for launching the attack against OPF. The detailed process of computing the critical attack vector can be found in Algorithm 2.
IV. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY
To defend against the investigated data integrity attack, we now develop defensive strategies from the following two aspects: 1) protection-based defense and 2) detection-based defense. For the protection-based defense scheme, we identify the most critical nodes in the system, and protect them by deploying smart sensors (e.g., PMU) with high security capability. For the detection-based scheme, we monitor the difference of the phase angle in the transmission lines as the feature for detecting the existence of attack. In addition, temporal-based scheme is developed to detect the attacks over time. In the following, we introduce the developed defense schemes in detail.
A. Protecting Critical Measurement Nodes
Recall that in the data integrity attack, the adversary needs to capture the measurement equipment (remote terminal unit, smart meters and sensors, etc.) and inject the attack vector. Thus, one way to deal with such an attack is to protect the measurements of nodes from being compromised. As a power grid system commonly covers a large geographical area and deploy a large number of measurement devices to monitor the state of the system, it is impractical to protect all of the measurement devices by deploying smart sensors (e.g., PMU) in the system. Thus, to resist the data integrity attack in OPF given the limited deployment resources, we choose the most critical nodes to protect, which, if compromised, would lead to the greatest impact on OPF.
Recall that the total load active power is certain and equal to the output of the generator. Thus, to increase the value of F(P g ) in OPF, the only option for the adversary is to manipulate the load active power P d of two or more critical nodes, such that transmission power flows of some lines approach their upper limits. In this case, once the power flows are redistributed, the output of generator P g will be manipulated, and the minimum fuel cost F(P g ) will be increased in comparison with the original optimal value by OPF.
Recall that from the adversary's point of view, the line where the actual transmission power is close to its upper limit is the preferred line to compromise. Thus, the nodes that are connected to such lines become critical, from the defender's perspective. In addition, the nodes that have larger load active power are important, because a larger value of load active power provides a higher flexibility for the adversary to inject false information into the system. Thus, we can leverage the protection-based defense scheme based on the deployment and configuration of smart sensors, such as PMU [36] in critical locations, or leverage physical safeguard procedures to protect these critical nodes, making OPF resilient to the investigated attack. The main operation of this scheme is to find the critical nodes, which are those with large load active power. The computation overhead is O(N), where N is the number of nodes. Regarding communication overhead, the information that must be communicated is the load active power P d at each node. Assuming the size of P d is 8 bits, the communication overhead is 8 * N bits, where N is the number of nodes.
B. Detecting False Measurements
During the process of data collection from the measurement equipment to OPF, several vulnerable components should be passed by (state estimation, etc.), the adversary is capable of manipulating the measurements in the data collection process. We now develop a defensive scheme to detect the anomalous information as well.
Recall that once the adversary falsifies the load active power P d at target nodes, OPF will recompute the power flow and have a new set of output for the generator. When this occurs, the parameters, including the voltage and phase angle at each node, will be changed as well. Nonetheless, the power balance constraint in the power grid system should be satisfied at all times, no matter whether the attack is in place or not. Then, we have (18) where the left and right parts are the sum of generator output and the load active power, respectively, i is the number of node, and j is the number of generator.
We can derive the power equation between node i and j after the attack vector is injected as
Here, P C i and P C j are power consumption at node i and j, where P i d and P j d are falsified load active power and the generator output correspondingly.
As a result, the new transmission power flow P i,j between node i and node j can be expressed as
where θ i and θ j are the phase angle of node i and j after the attack is launched, respectively.
Based on (19) and (20), the difference of phase angles between node i and j can be derived by
Due to the power capacity limit of the transmission line, the transmission power flow is always limited by P ij ≤ P Lmax (22) where the P Lmax represents the power flow capacity of line L between node i and node j, which is constant and determined by the physical property of the transmission line L. According to Section III-B, we know that the minimum fuel cost cannot be increased if the transmission power flow is below its upper capacity. Thus, we consider choosing the difference of phase angles (θ ij ) between node i and node j as the detection feature. The defender is able to detect the existence of an attack by comparing it with θ , which is the maximum value of the difference of phase angels and can be expressed to be (23) where P Lmax is a set of steady state values, and d ij is the admittance of line connected by node i and j. The admittance d ij = g ij +jb ij , where g ij and b ij are the resistance and electrical susceptance between node i and node j, which are given and remain constant. Thus, the value of θ is fixed. Once θ ij > θ , it can be confirmed that the system is being attacked, mostly occurring at node i and node j. In this scheme for detecting false measurements, we know that the adversary is capable of manipulating measurements. Thus, to detect the attack, we consider the comparison of the current difference of phase angles of each branch θ ij with the expected difference of phase angles of each branch θ . This means that we first need to compute the expected difference of phase angles at each branch θ , and then compare them with the current difference of phase angles of each branch θ ij based on the measurement data from sensors. Thus, the computation overhead is O(M), where M is the number of branches. To compute the current and expected difference of phase angles at each branch, the measurement data that the system needs to obtain from sensors includes the manipulated load active power P i d and generator output P j d at each node, the power flow capacity P Lmax , and the admittance of line d ij of each branch. Assuming that the size of each data item is 8 bits. The communication overhead is 16 * N + 16 * M bits, as the system needs to obtain the four aforementioned measurements from sensors, where N is the number of nodes and M is the number of branches.
C. Temporal-Based Detection
To detect the stealthy attack that marginally manipulates the load active power over time, we now show the temporalbased detection based on the on-line nonparametric cusum scheme [37] . The detection scheme considers two original hypotheses: 1) H o (normal state) and 2) H 1 (attacked state), assuming that the observation y(i) begins with H o , and changes to H 1 at time k s . The objective of the detection scheme is to detect the above change as soon as possible. With respect to the false positive rate, the detection scheme tends to minimize the detection time N(N ≥ k s ) , where the test terminates and a decision is made to decide whether a change occurs or not.
Recall that in this paper, the probability distribution of the system under the data integrity attack is unknown. We can take advantage of the detection scheme without knowing the priori knowledge of the probability distribution of the attack. Denote P i d as the load active power of node i. To detect the attack over time based on the detection scheme, the observation function y i (k) is defined by
is the measurement of the load active power of node i at time k, P i d (k) is the historical measurement data of the load active power at node i. Notice that η i is determined
, and the expected value of
Thus, the nonparametric statistics for i th measurement can be derived by
Then, we obtain a decision rule based on
Here, τ i is the threshold, which is determined by the false positive rate on ith measurement. For the purpose of verifying the effectiveness of the temporal-based detection, the false positive rate is considered as a metric, which is defined as the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis H o . Obviously, the higher detection performance coincides with the smaller false positive rate. For the temporal-based detection scheme, we need to compare the current load active power P i d (t) and historical load active power P i d (t) at each time slot, to determine whether there is a stealthy attack at this node. Thus, the computation overhead is O(N), where N is the number of nodes. To detect the attack, the system needs to accumulate the system error at each time slot. The necessary information that the system needs to know for each time slot t are the current load active power P i d (t) and the historical measurement of load active power P i d (t). Thus, in each time slot, the system only needs to obtain the current load active power at each node. We assume that the size of load active power is 8 bits, and thereby the communication overhead is 8 * N bits, where N is the number of nodes. To summarize, for the temporal-based detection scheme, the computational overhead is O(N) and the communication overhead is 8 * N bits.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation results to show the effectiveness of our investigated attack scheme and the corresponding defensive schemes. In the following, we first present the evaluation setup, and then show the evaluation results. 
A. Evaluation Setup
In our experiment, based on the attack scheme developed in Section III-B, we have first identified the targeted nodes, and then computed the critical attack vector based on the investigated attack scheme. We have evaluated the data integrity attack against OPF in three scenarios: 1) the system is not under attack; 2) the system is under the attack where the attack vector exceeds the critical attack vector, denoted as postcritical attack; and 3) the system is under the attack, in which the attack vector is below the critical attack vector, denoted as below critical attack. We have also compared our developed attack scheme with the random attack strategy, which aims to achieve the largest increment of minimum fuel cost regardless of the attack cost, so that a large number of nodes need to be compromised in such an attack. To launch the random attack, we denote the P i d as the input vector and the minimum fuel cost F(P i g ) as evaluation function, while various constraints are also satisfied in OPF. By leveraging genetic algorithm, a sets of P i d that increase the minimum fuel cost most can be obtained.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense mechanisms, we utilize minimum fuel cost as a primary metric. Moreover, we consider the load active power of target nodes and generator active power to assess the performance of both the attack and defense schemes. The parameters used in the experiments, including the values of measurements, are all based on the MATLAB package MATPOWER. As an example, the IEEE 30-bus system is shown in Fig. 2 . All the factors related to generators a i , b i , and c i in the IEEE 30-bus system are given in Table II . All the experiments are conducted on a computer with 3.5 GHz Intel Core i7-3770 CPU and 8 GB RAM. 
B. Evaluation Results

1) Results of Attack Strategy:
In the simulation, we evaluate our proposed attack strategy on IEEE 14, 30, and 118-bus system, respectively. Due to limited space, we only show the results of three metrics on IEEE 118-bus system as examples.
a) IEEE 118-bus case: Fig. 3 shows the results of the IEEE 118-bus system with respect to the aforementioned three scenarios (without attack, postcritical attack, and below critical attack). Fig. 3(a) illustrates the load active power of attacked nodes 8, 54, and 59, with the respect to the three scenarios. Meanwhile, the generator output P g i is changed simultaneously as shown in Fig. 3(b) . As we can see from the figure, when the attack is in place, the fuel cost of the IEEE 118-bus system is increased by $ 65.57 /hr above the system without an attack.
We can observe from Fig. 4 that if the adversary is able to tamper with the load active power as much as possible, a significant increase of minimum fuel cost will be achieved. In particular, the fuel cost F(P g ) are increased by $ 6749.99 /hr, which is nearly 5.36 % more in comparison with the system without an attack. In Fig. 4(a) , the adversary needs to compromise more than half of the nodes in the system in order to launch the attack, which obviously incurs a high attack cost.
b) Minimum fuel cost versus various systems and attack intensity:
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack scheme, we compare the minimum fuel cost of our proposed attack scheme with the random attack, and with no attack, on IEEE 6, 9, 14, 30, and 118 bus systems. The results are shown in Table III . We can observe that although the random attack is able to incur much higher fuel cost than the postcritical attack that we have investigated, it requires the adversary to compromise almost all load nodes, which is unrealistic in real-world practice due to limited attack resources. In addition, we evaluate the variation of the minimum fuel cost with the increase of attack intensity in IEEE 6, 9, 14, 30, and 118 bus systems as shown in Fig. 5 . We can see from the figure that the minimum fuel cost increases when the attack intensity grows. In addition, for each system, if the intensity of the attack vector exceeds its upper limitation, the equality constraints on the active power of the target nodes cannot be satisfied. Specifically, the upper limitation of attack intensity in IEEE 6, 9, 14, 30, and 118-bus systems are nearly 51 %, 32 %, 83 %, 72 %, and 57 % of load active power, respectively, at the target nodes.
2) Results of Defense Strategies: a) Protection-based defense scheme: We evaluate our protection-based defense scheme on IEEE 14, 30, and 118-bus systems. Fig. 6 shows the results of the minimal fuel cost with respect to different attack intensities in the scenarios, in which the critical nodes are protected and not protected. From Fig. 6(a) , we can observe that if the critical nodes are not protected, when the attack intensity is 65 %, and nodes 3 and 6 are captured by the adversary, the fuel cost is increased. Nonetheless, after protecting those nodes, although the adversary has to compromise another three nodes 2, 4, and 9, the minimum fuel cost remains unchanged, meaning that the data integrity attack becomes ineffective in this case. In the IEEE 30-bus system, when the adversary manipulates the load active power at nodes 8 and 30, the $ 60 /hr increase on the minimum fuel cost can be achieved by launching the attack with less than 50 % attack intensity. By protecting these critical nodes, only a small increase of the minimum fuel cost can be achieved after the attack is in place. The similar results are obtained from the IEEE 118-bus system as well. Thus, we can conclude that our protection-based defense scheme is effective in making the system resilient to the data integrity attack. b) False measurement detection: To evaluate the effectiveness of the detection-based scheme, we have carried out the experiments on IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus test systems. Fig. 7 shows the difference of phase angles (θ i,j ) in each line for the cases where the attack is in place, and not in place, for IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus system. From Fig. 7(a) , we can observe the difference of phase angle on branch 10 is larger than its upper limit (θ ) with attack, where the branch 10 is the transmission line between nodes 5 and 6, meaning that the adversary has likely falsified the measurements from nodes 5 and 6. Similarly, from Fig. 7(b) and (c), we can observe that in the IEEE 30-bus system, the attacked lines are 10 and 38, while in the IEEE 118-bus system, the attacked line are line 3, 18, 86, and 141. The evaluation results demonstrate that the defender can accurately detect the data integrity attacks and identify the target nodes or the lines through our proposed detection strategy. c) Temporal-based detection: To validate the temporalbased detection scheme, we have implemented the defense scheme on IEEE 14, 30, and 118-bus systems. In our experiment, we choose the active power (P i d ) of target nodes selected by Algorithm 1 to carry out the detect. We have carried out the experiments without attack for one hour and collected the measurements of P i d . We ran simulations for 1000 times without attacks, and computed the total number of false positives in different values of threshold τ . We define the false positive rate P F as P F = (#false alarms/1000). The detection results in IEEE 14, 30, and 118-bus systems versus various τ are shown in Fig. 8 . As can be seen in the figure, the false positive rate becomes extraordinary low when τ is larger a certain value. For example, in the IEEE 30-bus system, the false positive rate approaches zero when τ > 32. Fig. 9 illustrates the average detection time of the developed temporal-based detection scheme, which is the result of executing 1000 simulation rounds in IEEE 14, 30, and 118-bus systems, each. We can observe that the average detection time is increased as threshold τ increases, because threshold τ is selected based on the false positive rate. Notice that there exists a tradeoff between average detection time and false positive rate. In particular, we find that a higher threshold τ reduces the false positive rate, but also reduces the sensitivity of the detecting scheme. Then, only when the accumulated error is significantly large, the detecting system can recognize the attack. Thus, the detection time will continue to increase if the threshold τ grows. In order to maintain the stable operation of the power grid system, we need to find a threshold τ to ensure an appropriate detection time, as well as an appropriate false positive rate.
VI. RELATED WORK
Cyber attacks, especially data integrity attacks against the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and EMS system in the power grid system have drawn much attention in the past [14] , [18] , [20] , [38] - [42] . For example, Yang et al. [40] investigated the data integrity attack, which is able to falsify the measured data with the minimum number of compromised sensors and bypass conventional BDDI mechanism in state estimation. Mo et al. [43] analyzed the impact of data integrity attacks on the industrial control system, particularly the impact on control and scheduling module in EMS. Lin et al. [14] investigated the impact of data integrity attack on the integration of microgrids in the smart grid. Zhang et al. [18] investigated the impact of data integrity attacks on real-time price in the smart grid.
Regarding the integrity attacks against OPF, very few related works have been carried out [28] , [29] . For example, Rahman et al. [28] showed that once the adversary has an ability to tamper with load active power of some nodes in the power grid system, the minimum fuel cost of OPF could be increased. In addition, the impact of the data integrity attack against OPF and economic operation were evaluated in [29] . Nonetheless, the existing research efforts only considered attacks against OPF by randomly launching attacks.
With respect to defensive schemes against data integrity attacks in power grid systems, a number of research efforts have been conducted [17] , [25] , [44] - [49] . Most existing research efforts have focused on the data integrity attacks against key functional modules such as state estimation. For example, Yu et al. [25] proposed combining statistical anomaly based detection and a watermarking-based detection technique in dealing with data integrity attacks. Kosut et al. [44] designed the countermeasures to overcome data integrity attacks on state estimation of the power grid.
In contrast, in this paper we address the issue of the data integrity attacks against OPF in the smart grid. We consider the new challenges that have not been investigated before, and develop schemes to address these challenges: determining the minimum set of target nodes to compromise, and deriving the critical attack vector to achieve the minimum false data injection. In addition, to combat such a data integrity attack, we propose effective defense schemes by protecting critical nodes, and detecting the attack that utilizes the difference of phase angles as the detection feature.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the issue of data integrity attacks against OPF, which is one of the key functional modules in the smart grid, as a typical application supported by IoT. Particularly, we have first formalized the problem of optimizing the data integrity attack against OPF with the least effort (e.g., the least number of nodes to manipulate and the least false information injected into the system), and developed mechanisms to identify the target nodes to be compromised, computing the critical attack vector to make the attack feasible and resource optimal. To combat the investigated data integrity attack, we have developed two types of defensive schemes, namely protecting critical nodes and detection based on the difference of phase angles and nonparametric cusum. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our investigated data integrity attack, we have conducted experiments on various IEEE standard bus systems. The experimental results show that the investigated attack can increase the minimum fuel cost while bypassing the detection of BDDI. In comparison with the random attack, the investigated attack is more efficient in identifying the attack vector. Our proposed defensive schemes are capable of reducing the impact of the attack significantly, and identifying the existence of such attacks accurately and rapidly. Donghe Li received the B.S. degree in automa
